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NOTES
STATUTES OF LIMITATION IN THE SALES TRANSACTION
The multiplicity of legal duties arising out of the modern inter-
play of free economic forces frequently places an injured party in the
enviable position of having more than one possible remedy against
his adversary. This is especially so in those situations where the
parties assume a dual or plural relationship toward one another. A
common example occurs in the usual sales transaction. The vendor
there assumes liability for any injury that may befall the purchaser
through his negligence in preparing or storing the goods sold. In
addition, he is potentially liable for a breach of warranty should the
article in question be deficient. This may be either an express prom-
ise on the part of the supplier, or the implied warranties of mer-
chantability I or fitness for use 2 which the law imposes. It is not
unusual, therefore, to find causes of action in negligence and warranty
joined and tried together.3
Despite the similarities between them, however, the two grounds
of action stem from widely dissimilar sources, 4 with the consequence
that major procedural and substantive differences separate them. Not
the least of the marks which keep them distinct is the variance in the
law of limitations applicable to each.5 It is the purpose of this note
1 N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 96(2).
2Id. § 96(1).
3 See, e.g., McGrath v. Helena Rubinstein, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y.
1939); Pearlman v. Garrod Shoe Co., 276 N.Y. 172, 11 N.E.2d 718 (1937);
Great American Indemnity Co. v. Lapp Insulator Co., 282 App. Div. 545, 125
N.Y.S.2d 147 (4th Dep't 1953); Gile v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 281 App. Div.
95, 120 N.Y.S.2d 258 (3d Dep't 1952).
4 Actions on express warranty were originally tort actions in deceit. See
Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1888). In the
eighteenth century, however, the action of assumpsit was allowed for such
warranties. See 1 WILLISTON, SALES 504 (Rev. ed. 1948). Beginning in
1815, the English courts began to imply warranties of quality in certain situa-
tions, which eventually came to embrace substantially the same categories now
covered in UNIFORM SALES AcT § 15. This section was taken nearly verbatim
from the English Sale of Goods Act, which codified the common law. See
1 WILLISTON, SALES 582 et seq. (Rev. ed. 1948). Liability in negligence by a
vendor or other contracting party, on the other hand, has always been recog-
nized as a distinct ground for action, even in the absence of express warranty.
See POLLOCK, TORTS 335 (15th ed. 1951). Of course, the plaintiff could not be
compensated twice for the same facts. Ibid.
5 For a discussion of the general problem see PRASHKER, NaW YORK PRAc-
TicE §§ 27A, 27B (3d ed. 1954).
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to deal with the limitation peculiarities of each of the two causes of
action, indicating both the proper period to apply and the character-
istic method of measuring the limitation.
Negligence
In any discussion of negligence in the vendor-vendee situation,
the starting point must be the case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.6
It will be recalled that that decision was the vehicle wherein one of
our State's most eminent jurists laid down with finality a rule of law
which had evolved over several decades, i.e., that the supplier of a
defective article is liable to any person injured thereby, where
".. . the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to
place life and limb in peril when negligently made. . . ."1 Originally
no such rule could have existed, since the law was conceived to be
that a supplier owed a duty of care only to those in privity of contract
with him." At the same time, parties not in privity were allowed to
recover in tort, but only in those instances where the defendant had
negligently supplied an article which, by its nature, was inherently
dangerous to life and limb.9 By extending the remedy to anyone
injured by a negligently constructed article, the MacPherson case
apparently jettisonned the contractual element in the concept of the
duty owed, which had been the underlying rationale of the earlier
decisions.
In cases of the MacPherson variety, despite the contractual back-
ground of the situation, there does not appear to be any question but
that the tort limitation period is applicable.10 A problem, the solu-
tion of which is uncertain, however, is that of when the applicable
limitation commences to run. The general rule, repeatedly stated by
courts and legislators, is that statutes of limitation commence to run
from the time that a cause of action accrues." It is the general rule
6217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (per Cardozo, J.).
7 Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053. See also Genesee County Patrons Fire Re-
lief Ass'n v. L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 263 N.Y. 463, 189 N.E. 551 (1934),
where the rule was extended to apply to property damage cases. The
MacPherson rule was applied to one who supplies a defective article to a lessee
in La Rocca v. Farrington, 301 N.Y. 247, 93 N.E.2d 829 (1950), 25 ST. JoHN's
L. REv. 390 (1951).8 Losee v. Clute, 51 N.Y. 494 (1873); Loop v. Litchfield, 42 N.Y. 351
(1870); Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex.
1842).
9 Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 396 (1852). See 4 SHERMAN AND RED-
FiELD, NEGLIGENCE 1571 et seq. (Rev. ed. 1941).
20 McGrath v. Helena Rubinstein, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
"See Maguire v. Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc'y, 23 Cal.2d 719, 146 P.2d
673, 680 (1944); State ex rel. McClure v. Northrop, 93 Conn. 558, 106 Atl.
504, 506 (1919); Grant v. Williams, 158 Neb. 107, 62 N.W2d 532, 536 (1954) ;
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Carson, 187 Tenn. 157, 213 S.W2d 45, 51
1954 ]
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that the cause of action in a contract action accrues immediately upon
the occurrence of a breach. 12 Much more rare is a statement defin-
ing just when, in a negligence action, that event takes place. In neg-
ligence cases the cause of action is usually held to accrue upon the
happening of a legal injury.'3  The latter is so even though at the time
of the injury no substantial damages are inflicted,"4 or, having been
inflicted, their true extent cannot at that time be appreciated.' 5
A particularly vexing problem is found in those cases where a
considerable period of time elapses between the consummation of the
wrongful act and the occurrence of any legal harm to the plaintiff.
If the period of limitation in such situations were to run from the
time of the wrongful act, the plaintiff might find, in extreme cases,
that his remedy was barred before he was injured. If, on the other
hand, it were not to begin to run until the injury were to occur, the
tortfeasor might be forced to submit to potential liability for an extra-
ordinary period of time.' 6 If periods of limitation are to be measured
(1948). For legislative employment of this terminology, see statutes cited in
footnote 22 infra.
12 See Bykowsky v. Public National Bank, 209 App. Div. 61, 204 N.Y.
Supp. 385 (1st Dep't 1924), aff'd mern., 240 N.Y. 555, 148 N.E. 702 (1925) ;
Ahrens v. Guaranty Trust Co., 125 Misc. 443, 211 N.Y. Supp. 283 (App. T.
1st Dep't 1925); Reynolds Metals Co. v. McCrea, 99 A2d 84 (D.C. 1953);
see Crawford v. Duncan, 61 Cal. App. 647, 215 Pac. 573, 574 (1923).
13 See, e.g., Finck v. Albers Super Markets, Inc., 136 F.2d 191 (6th Cir.
1943); Di Gironimo v. American Seed Co., 96 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Pa. 1951);
Gile v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 281 App. Div. 95, 120 N.Y.S.2d 258 (3d Dep't
1952). The setting in motion of forces which eventually produce injury does
not start the period running until the injury actually occurs. See Pollock v.
Pittsburgh, B. & L.E.R.R., 275 Pa. 467, 119 Ati. 547 (1923).
14 Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Trans. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824
(1936). This is one of a host of cases involving the general factual pattern
wherein a servant inhales deleterious matter while working, and discovers sev-
eral years after leaving the master's employ that a silicotic lung condition has
developed. Since the real injury in such cases is not inflicted by the dust it-
self, but by the secondary results which occur some years later, the statute
of limitations may have run before any substantial damage has been sustained.
See, e.g., Michalek v. United States Gypsum Co., 76 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1935),
rev'd, 298 U.S. 639 (1936); Brown v. Tennessee Consol. Coal Co., 19 Tenn.
App. 123, 83 S.W.2d 568 (1935); Scott v. Rinehart & Dennis Co., 116 W. Va.
319, 180 S.E. 276 (1935).
15 Kennedy v. Johns-Mansville Sales Corp., 135 Conn. 176, 62 A.2d 771
(1948) (negligent injury to property); cf. Industrial Chrome Plating Co. v.
North, 175 Ore. 351, 153 P.2d 835 (1944); see City of Miami v. Brooks, -
Fla. -, 70 So.2d 306, 308 (1954). The amount of the damages, of course,
may be affected by developments which occur subsequently. See Gardner v.
Beck, 195 Iowa 62, 189 N.W. 962 (1922).
16 The German and Swiss Codes attempt to cope with the problem by em-
ploying two periods of limitation, a long period which runs from the time of
the injury, and a short period which runs from the discovery of the injury.
See Developments in the Lau-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. RFv.
1177, 1178 (1950).
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from the date that a cause of action accrues, logic would seem to de-
mand that no period should run until there has been an injury re-
ceived, for, patently, a plaintiff cannot have a cause of action for a
wrong he has not yet suffered. If the remedy has not yet come into
existence it cannot be barred.17
These elemental conclusions were called into question in 1952
by the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, in the case
of Dincher v. Marlin Firearns Co.,'8 a case similar in principle and
facts to the MacPherson case. In the Dincher case the court was
called upon to interpret a Connecticut negligence limitation statute,
which barred the bringing of an action after one year ".... from the
date of the act or omission complained of. .... , 19 On the facts,
more than a year had passed since the defective article was supplied,
but less than a year had elapsed since the injury. The court, rea-
soning that the "act or omission complained of" must have happened
no later than the date when the defendant parted with the defective
goods, held that the statute of limitations began to run at that time,
and the plaintiff's remedy was consequently barred. 20  In dissenting,
Judge Frank pointedly called attention to the illogic of the majority
opinion, which purported to bar a remedy which had never existed.
The absurdity of the opinion is underlined by the fact that the plain-
tiff, prior to his injury, had no cause of action at all, since he lacked
privity of contract with the defendant. He could not have even re-
covered the price of the defective article. To attribute such a stultify-
ing intent to the Connecticut legislature was unnecessary, Judge Frank
explained, since the history of the act in question indicates that the
words "act or omission" were intended to mean "injury or neglect,"
and so the period should not be computed from the date of sale, but
from the date of the injury 2 '
An analysis of the various statutes of limitation presently in
force in the United States discloses that the Connecticut statute in-
volved in the Din-cher case is unique. The majority of jurisdictions
forestall complications by providing in their statutes that the limita-
tion period shall run from the time when the cause of action accrues,22
17 See the statement by Vaughan Williams, L.J., in Thomson v. Lord Clan-
morris, [1900] 1 Ch. 718, 728-729 (C.A.), that "[a] Statute of Limitations
cannot begin to run unless there are two things present-a party capable of
suing and a party liable to be sued."is 198 F2d 821 (2d Cir. 1952).
29 CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 8324 (1949).
20 The Dincher case is not alone in holding that a negligence action may be
barred before it accrues. See Hooper v. Carr Lumber Co., 215 N.C. 308,
1 S.E.2d 818 (1939). The Hooper case has never been followed, and the case
of Mobley v. Murray County, 178 Ga. 388, 173 S.E. 680 (1934), upon which
it rests, is an action for money had and received, and, in the author's opinion,
is not in point at all.
21 198 F.2d 821, 823 et seq. (2d Cir. 1952) (dissenting opinion).
2 2 ALA. CODE tit. 7, §§ 18, 26 (1940); ALASKCA ComP. LAws ANN. tit. 55,
1954 ] NO TES
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or words of similar import,23 while the remainder (excepting Con-
necticut) leave the question open for judicial interpretation.24
In view of the unusual statute involved in the Dincher case,
coupled with the unfortunate interpretation given to it, it is unlikely
that a substantial body of law will grow from that decision. To fore-
stall any more hard cases, however, it is to be hoped that Connecticut
will modify her limitation statute so as to bring it into harmony with
those of her sister states.
Breach of Implied Warranty
In New York,2 5 as in other jurisdictions,2 6 certain statutory war-
ranties are implied automatically in every sale of goods. These im-
plied warranties contain elements of both tort and contract, 27 and in
consequence, complete unanimity has not always prevailed among the
states concerning which limitation period is applicable in an action
for damages arising from their breach.28 In New York, where the
§ 55-2-1 (1949); ARiz. CODE ANN. § 29-202 (1939); ARK. STAT. § 37-206
(1947); CAL. CODE CIV. PRoC. § 312 (1953); COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 102, § 1
(1935); ILL. REV. STAT. c. 83, § 15 (1951); IND. STAT. ANN. § 2-602 (Burns,
Supp. 1953) ; IOWA CODE c. 614, § 614.1 (1950) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-306
(1949); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §413.140 (Baldwin, 1943); ME. REv. STAT.
c. 99, § 90 (1944); MD. CODE ANN. art. 57, § 1 (Flack, 1951); MASS. LAWS
ANN. c. 260, § 4 (1933) ; MIcH. ComP. LAWS § 609.13(2) (1948); MINN. STAT.§§541.01, 541.05 (1949); Miss. CODE ANN. §722 (1942); Mo. REv. STAT.
§§516.100, 516.120 (1949); NEB. REv. STAT. §§25-204, 25-207 (1943);
N.H. REV. LAWS c. 385, § 3 (1942); N.J. REv. STAT. tit. 2, § 2:24-2 (1937);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§27-101, 27-107 (1941); N.Y. CIv. PRAc. ACT §49(6);
N.D. REv. CODE §28-0116 (1943); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §95 (1951); ORE.
REv. STAT. C. 12, §§12.010, 12.110 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §51
(Purdon, 1953); R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 510, §1 (1938); S.D. CODE §33.0232
(1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8595 (Williams, 1934); TEX. Civ. STAT. art. 5526
(Vernon, 1948); UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 78, §§ 78-12-1, 78-12-25 (1953); VT.
STAT. § 1689 (1947); VA. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 8-24 (1950); WASH. REV. CODE
tit. 4, §§4.16.010, 4.16.080 (1951); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5404 (1949); Wis.
STAT. §§ 330.14, 330.19 (1953) ; Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-503, 3-506 (1945).
2 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8118 (1953); D.C. CODE tit. 12, § 201 (1951);
GA. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 3-1004 (1933) ; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. tit. 23, § 2305.10
(Baldwin, 1953).
24 FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (1951); IDAHO CODE tit. 5, §§ 5-214, 5-219 (1948);
LA. STAT. ANN. Civ. CODE art. 3536 (1952) ; MONT. REV. CODE c. 26, §§ 93-2601,
93-2605 (1947); NEV. ComP. LAWS §8524 (Hillyer, 1929); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 1-46, 1-52 (Michie, 1953) ; S.C. CODE tit. 10, §§ 10-141, 10-143 (1952).
25 N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 96.
26 See UNIFORM SALES ACT § 15. The Sales Act has been adopted in thirty-
four states, Alaska, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia.
27 See Buyers v. Buffalo Paint & Specialties CO., 199 Misc. 764, 774, 99
N.Y.S.2d 713, 723 (Sup. Ct. 1950). See 1 WILLISTON, SALES 502 (Rev. ed.
1948).
28 Compare Schlick v. New York Dugan Bros., Inc., 175 Misc. 182, 22
N.Y.S.2d 238 (N.Y. City Ct. 1940), and Seymour v. Union News Co., 349
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tort limitation was applied in the past to the breach of implied war-
ranty situation,2 9 it has now been definitely settled that the contract
limitation is properly applicable.30 This position is consistent with
the greater weight given to the contractual element in actions for
breach of implied warranty. In suits grounded upon this theory,
there must exist privity of contract between the parties for the action
to be maintainable.31  This is, of course, basically different from the
holding in the MacPherson case, according to which, as previously
noted, no privity at all need exist between the parties.3 2
Warranties, generally speaking, may be either prospective or
present in nature.3 3 A prospective warranty, which refers to a future
event, is not breached until the defect in the goods becomes known
to the buyer. Perhaps the most common example occurs in those
cases where a vendor sells seeds or seedlings, and warrants that they
will bear a particular type of fruit. In such a case the warranty is
not breached until the defect is or should have been discovered, that
is, when the plant matures.34 This being the case, the cause of action
accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run at that time.35
Other fact situations involving prospective warranties adopt the same
Ill. App. 197, 110 N.E.2d 475 (1953) (tort period applied), with Southern
California Enterprises, Inc. v. D. N. & E. Walter & Co., 78 Cal. App.2d 750,
178 P.2d 785 (1947) (by implication), and Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823,
18 P.2d 199 (1933) (contract period applied). One very simple way of avoid-
ing such problems is to have the same limitation period for tort and contract,
as do the English. 2 & 3 GEO. 6, c. 21, Part I, § 2(la) (1939).
2 9 Buyers v. Buffalo Paint & Specialties Co., supra note 27; Schlick v. New
York Dugan Bros., Inc., supra note 28.3 0 Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421
(1953), 28 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 127. Accord, Drooby v. Collins, 281 App. Div.
733, 117 N.Y.S.2d 905 (3d Dep't 1952). The Blessington case has been fol-
lowed in an action for property damage. See Great American Indemnity Co.
v. Lapp Insulator Co., 282 App. Div. 545, 125 N.Y.S.2d 147 (4th Dep't 1953).
31 Gimenez v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 264 N.Y. 390, 191 N.E. 27 (1934);
Turner v. Edison Storage Battery Co., 248 N.Y. 73, 161 N.E. 423 (1928);
Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923).
32 There has been a hint that the strict requirement of privity will not be
with us much longer in breach of implied warranty, however. See Pearlman
v. Garrod Shoe Co., 276 N.Y. 172, 177, 11 N.E.2d 718, 719 (1937). The
proposed Uniform Commercial Code, if New York adopts it, will abolish the
privity requirement as to those members of the vendee's family who may be
reasonably expected to use the goods. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318
(1952); see Fagan, Sales and Security Law, 26 ST. Jonx's L. REv. 72, 80
(1951).
33 See 1 WmUisTor, SLaLs 548 (Rev. ed. 1948).
34 Burge v. Albany Nurseries, Inc., 176 Cal. 313, 168 Pac. 343 (1917);
Sherer v. Park Nursery Co., 103 Cal. 415, 37 Pac. 412 (1894).
3 5 Woodworth v. Rice Bros. Co., 110 Misc. 158, 179 N.Y. Supp. 722 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd mern., 193 App. Div. 971, 184 N.Y. Supp. 958 (4th Dep't 1920),
aff'd vwm., 233 N.Y. 577, 135 N.E. 925 (1922) ; Firth v. Richter, 49 Cal. App.
545, 196 Pac. 277 (1920) ; Ingalls v. Angell, 76 "Wash. 692, 137 Pac. 309 (1913).
But cf. Allen v. Todd, 6 Lans. 222 (N.Y. Gen. T. 4th Dep't 1872).
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principle, so that no limitation period runs against the vendee until
the faultiness of the merchandise supplied becomes known (or should
have become known) to him.3 6
While this principle is clear where the prospective warranty is
involved, there appears to be a divergence of judicial opinion when
confronted with implied warranties which are present in nature. In
such situations, the courts of New York measure the limitation period
from the time that the goods are sold by the vendor, that is, when
the warranty is breached.37  This is in line with the general contract
rule that the statute of limitations runs from the time of the breach.38
The New York rule, of course, involves the same problem which was
noted earlier in respect to certain negligence situations, i.e., that the
plaintiff's limitation period may have run out before he has suffered
any substantial damage.39 To avoid this harsh and often inequitable
result, some courts have simply construed express warranties, which
were present on their face, as in reality prospective, where this would
seem to be the intent of the parties.40  Still other courts, all federal,
have held that the cause of action for breach of a present warranty
accrues when the defect is discovered. 41 Actually, the majority view
seems to be that the statute begins to run from the date of delivery
of the goods,42 a position which lies somewhere betweeen those of
the New York and the federal courts.
36 Woodward-Wight & Co. v. Engel Land & Lumber Co., 123 La. 1093,
49 So. 719 (1909); Felt v. Reynold's Fruit Evap. Co., 52 Mich. 602, 18 N.W.
378 (1884) (machine sold with warranty that it would operate when tested) ;
Heath v. Moncrieff Furnace Co., 200 N.C. 377, 156 S.E. 920 (1931) (heating
plant warranted to heat building wlen installed) ; see Cunningham v. Frontier
Lumber Co., 245 S.W. 270 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) (roofing material war-
ranted to give satisfactory service).
37 See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sheila-Lynn, Inc., 185 Misc. 689, 57
N.Y.S.2d 707 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1945), aff'd mem., 270 App. Div. 835, 61
N.Y.S.2d 373 (1st Dep't 1946).3 8 Wechsler v. Bowman, 285 N.Y. 284, 34 N.E.2d 322 (1941); see Baron
v. Kurn, 349 Mo. 1202, 164 S.W.2d 310 (1942); cf. Singleton v. Lewis, 3 Ky.
265 (1808).
39 This difficulty was recognized by the court in the Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co. case, supra note 37 at 693, 57 N.Y.S.2d at 710, but no solution is there
offered.
40 See note 35 supra. In all these cases the warranty was express, but there
seems to be no valid reason why the same interpretation cannot be given to an
implied warranty where the situation demands it. This was, in fact, suggested
in Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sheila-Lynn, Inc., supra note 37 at 695-696, 57
N.Y.S.2d at 713 (concurring opinion).
41 See, e.g., John S. Sills & Sons, Inc. v. Bridgeton Condensed Milk Co.,
43 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1930); P. H. Sheehy Co. v. Eastern Importing & Mfg.
Co., 44 App. D.C. 107, L.R.A. 1916F 810 (1915); see New Amsterdam Cas-
ualty Co. v. Baker, 74 F. Supp. 809, 811 (D. Md. 1947). Contra: Poole v.
Terminix Co., Inc., 200 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Foley Corp. v. Dove, 101
A.2d 841 (D.C. 1954).
42 See, e.g., Painter Fertilizer Co. v. Kil-Tone Co., 105 N.J.L. 109. 143 At.
332 (1928); Woodland Oil Co. v. A. M. Byers & Co., 223 Pa. 241, 72 Atl. 518
(1909) ; Battley v. Faulkner, 3 B. & Ald. 288, 106 Eng. Rep. 668 (1820).
[ VOL. 29
No matter which view is adopted, the plaintiff is nonsuited if
the period of limitation has run out, regardless of whether or not his
damages are as yet ascertainable,4 3 just as in the negligence situation
earlier discussed.
The conflicting demands made by plaintiff and defendant of the
courts and legislatures in ascertaining the limitation of a particular
action lend emphasis to a moral problem in the law. While the one
party is entitled to that peace of mind which comes with the knowledge
that ancient adverse claims have been laid to rest, the other is, in
common justice, entitled to a remedy after he knows that he is in-
jured, and what his injuries are. In this latter respect there are
deficiencies in the law in both of the grounds of action here discussed.
Opinions such as that in the Dincher case not only fail to achieve
substantial justice, but tend to bring the law into disrepute among
laymen. While the law is more sensibly interpreted in the breach of
implied warranty situation, the plaintiff, in New York, might still
find that he has not any practical remedy. As long as such a con-
dition prevails, it cannot be said that an adequate form of justice is
being afforded to injured vendees by the courts in this State.
x
GORDON v. ELLIMAN-A FURTHER INROAD UPON THE RIGHTS
OF MINORITY STOCKHOLDERS
Rights of Shareholders
It is now well settled that a corporation is an entity separate and
distinct from the members that comprise it.' It is capable of owning
property in its name,2 making its own contracts,3 and may sue or be
sued in its own right. But being an "entity," recognizable only in
law, it is necessary that it act through the agency of the members that
comprise it. The law, therefore, has provided that the management
of a corporation shall be in the board of directors, 4 and the stock-
43New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Baker, supra note 41.
'See Warrior River Terminal Co. v. State, 257 Ala. 208, 58 So.2d 100,
101 (1952) ; Corporation Comm'n v. Consolidated Stage Co., 63 Ariz. 257, 161
P.2d 110, 111 (1945); Miller v. McColgan, 17 Cal.2d 432, 110 P.2d 419, 421(1941).2See Corporation Comm'n v. Consolidated Stage Co., supra note 1; Miller
v. McColgan, supra note 1; Button v. Hoffman, 61 Wis. 20, 20 N.W. 667, 668-
669 (1884).
3 See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 587 (U.S. 1839).
4 N.Y. Gm. Coip. LAW § 27. "The business of a corporation shall be
managed by its board of directors... .
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